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INTRODUCTION

The proper scope of federal habeas relief for state prisoners is
essentially a question of how federal courts should enforce federal
constitutional rights in the context of a state's criminal justice system. This
question implicates the complex interaction between the federal courts, the
states, and individuals. Efforts to conceptualize the federal habeas writ
naturally address issues of federalism, as courts and commentators strive to
balance the federal government's interest in enforcing federal rights with
the state government's interest in the finality of its convictions. They also
focus on the rights of the individual, analyzing the effect of federal habeas
on the ability of individuals to assert the rights provided them under federal
law. Topics impacting this debate include the parity (or lack of parity)
between state courts and federal courts in enforcing federal constitutional
rights, the need for comity towards state courts and decision-makers, the
rights of state defendants to federal court consideration of their federal law
claims, and the contours of the "Judicial Power" vested in the federal
courts.'
1. Among the foundational scholarship on the scope of federal habeas corpus is
Paul M. Bator, Finalityin CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982). For comprehensive lists
that include more recent scholarship, see Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable
Unreasonableness,Habeas Theory, andthe Nature ofLegal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
535, 546 n.22 (1999); Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799
n. 13 (1992).
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Nowhere is the interface between state and federal institutions more
directly implicated than in the "standard of review" that a federal court
must apply in deciding whether to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Likewise,
the standard of review fundamentally defines the scope of an individual
defendant's access to a federal forum for asserting his federal rights.
Understandably, then, what that standard should be has been the subject of
vigorous debate. The most controversial topic has been whether federal
habeas courts should defer to state courts on the interpretation and
application of federal law. While this debate is a vibrant one that will
surely continue, it is one that, at least from the Supreme Court's
standpoint, is over. After the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) and its recent interpretation by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Taylor,2 a federal court is no longer free to grant habeas relief
based solely on its independent interpretation and application of federal
law. 3 Under the provision of AEDPA codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
a federal court presented with a habeas petition must defer to a state court's
rejection of a petitioner's federal law claim unless the state court's
"decision" is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law.'
In light of AEDPA and Williams, this Article aims to shift, or at least
expand, the debate from the question of whether federal habeas courts must
defer to state courts on pure issues of federal law, to the question of how
federal habeas courts should defer. I focus on one of the critical issues left
unaddressed by the Williams Court: In applying the new standard, must the
federal habeas court review the state court's actual legal analysis; or must it
review only the state court's ultimate conclusion that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, regardless of how the state court interpreted and applied
federal law in reaching that conclusion?
Put another way, does
§ 2254(d)(1) target the state court's "opinion," as in the written decision
explaining the court's reasoning, or does it target the state court's "result,"
as in the actual order denying relief? This issue goes to the heart of how
federal habeas courts should apply § 2254(d)(1)'s standard of review, and
what the deferential standard of review is designed to accomplish.
I argue that § 2254(d)(1) bars federal habeas relief only when the
actual reasoning articulated by the state court passes muster under the
admittedly deferential standard of review. If the state court's actual
reasoning is "contrary to" or "involves an unreasonable application of"
established federal law, or if the state court fails to provide any basis for its
denial of relief, then the federal habeas court may proceed to independently
decide pure issues of federal law and its application. Part I of this Article
2.
3.
4.

529 U.S. 362 (2000).
See infra Part II.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. V 2000).
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surveys the history of the standard of review for federal habeas corpus,
beginning with Brown v. Allen5 in 1953 and culminating with Congress's
passage of AEDPA in 1996. Part II examines the recent decision in
Williams, the Supreme Court's first opportunity to construe and apply
§ 2254(d)(1), to assess what it did and did not resolve about the standard of
review for federal habeas. Part III argues that § 2254(d)(1)'s standard of
review should be read to preclude relief only where the state court's actual
opinion reasonably applies federal law, not where the result reached by the
state court could be deemed reasonable based on some other rationale that
might have passed muster under the deferential standard. This approach
would ensure that individuals receive one analytically sound adjudication of
their federal law claims. It would also create a tangible incentive for state
courts to adjudicate federal law claims thoroughly and explicitly, which
may in the long run enhance overall enforcement of federal rights. Part IV
argues that both the Williams decision and the text of AEDPA itself support
this reading of § 2254(d)(1). Part V responds to possible criticisms of this
reading. Part VI flags some important remaining issues concerning the
application of § 2254(d)(1).
I. EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FEDERAL HABEAS
PETITIONS BY STATE PRISONERS

This Part traces the development of the standard of review applied to
state prisoner federal habeas corpus claims over the course of the last fifty
years. Subpart A addresses Brown v. Allen and its adoption of a de novo
standard of review for questions of federal law and its application to
particular facts. Subpart B discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Teague v. Lane and the uncertainty it cast on Brown's de novo standard.
Subpart C examines how the Supreme Court wrestled with the effect of
Teague on the standard of review for federal habeas. Subpart D describes
Congress's enactment of a statutory standard of review with AEDPA.
A. Brown v. Allen and the "Golden Age" of FederalHabeas Corpus
The Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen was a critical
moment for federal habeas review of state court convictions.' Brown held
5.
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
6.
The scope of federal habeas prior to 1953 has been the subject of vigorous
debate among judges and scholars. There is no dispute that federal habeas cases from the
19th and early 20th centuries demonstrate that federal habeas relief was very difficult to

obtain. See, e.g., ExparteWatkins, 28 U.S. 193, 209 (1830) (denying petition for writ of
habeas corpus). But while some have read these cases to establish a fundamental limit on
the scope of federal habeas relief, others have argued that these cases simply reflect the lack
of substantive constitutional protections for criminal defendants at that time. Compare
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that federal courts considering a state prisoner's habeas petition must
review issues of federal constitutional law de novo, regardless of how the
state court interpreted the relevant constitutional principles.7 This de novo
standard also applies to mixed questions of law and fact, that is, questions
requiring the court to apply constitutional principles to a particular set of
facts!
Brown's adoption of de novo review kicked off a string of prodefendant habeas rulings by the Supreme Court, 9 which some have called
the "Golden Age" of federal habeas. 0 Although some criticized Brown as
Bator, supra note 1, at 463-99, with Peller, supra note 1, at 623-50; compare also Wright
v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285-86 n.3 (1992) (plurality opinion) (stating that prior to 1953 "a
prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus could challenge only the jurisdiction of the court
that had rendered the judgment under which he was in custody") with id. at 297-98
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("While it is true that a state prisoner could not obtain the writ
if he had been provided a full and fair hearing in the state courts, this rule governed the
merits of a claim under the Due Process Clause. It was not a threshold bar to the
consideration of other federal claims, because, with rare exceptions, there were no other
federal claims available at the time."). See generally Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling
Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 582-87 (1993).
7.
See Brown, 344 U.S. at 506 ("State adjudication of questions of law cannot,
under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions that
the federal judge is commanded to decide."); see also id. at 508 ("[N]o binding weight is to
be attached to the State determination ....
The State court cannot have the last say when
it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have
misconceived a federal constitutional right."); id. at 488 (Burton, J., concurring) ("[Justices
Burton and Clark] also recognize the propriety of the considerations to which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter invites the attention of a federal court when confronted with a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under the circumstances stated."); id. at 548-49 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I
agree with the Court that the District Court had habeas corpus jurisdiction in all the cases
including power to release either or all of the prisoners if held as a result of violation of
constitutional rights."). Except for state court rulings on factual issues and adequate state
law grounds, "the state adjudication carries the weight that federal practice gives to the
conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues. It
is not res judicata." Id. at 458.
8.
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (holding that "a mixed questio[n] of
fact and law" is "subject to plenary federal review") (quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Brown, 344 U.S. at 507.
Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but
calls for interpretation of the legal significance of such facts, the District Judge
must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values.
Thus, so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.
Id. (citation omitted).
9.
See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (establishing the standard for
obtaining an evidentiary hearing on federal habeas); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-41
(1963) (establishing the standard for when the failure to raise a federal issue in state court
bars federal habeas relief); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-23 (1963) (establishing
the standard for when the denial of a prior habeas petition bars the filing of a second or
successive petition).
10. Jordan Steiker, RestructuringPost-ConvictionReview ofFederal Constitutional
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allowing unwarranted relitigation of otherwise final state convictions, 11
several efforts to overrule Brown by statute were ultimately unsuccessful. 2
Thus, Brown's holding that federal habeas courts must independently
interpret and apply federal constitutional law survived. Even in the 1970s,

as the Supreme Court began to cut back in other areas of habeas corpus
law, 13 Brown's standard of review with respect to federal legal issues
remained untouched.
B. Teague v. Lane
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane14 called into
question Brown's de novo standard of review. In Teague, a state prisoner
sought habeas relief based on the racial composition of his petit jury,
including the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to exclude black
jurors. 5 The petitioner relied on a rule of law first expressed in Batson v.
Kentucky, 6 which was decided after his conviction became final. '" He also

sought to extend Taylor v. Louisiana's" "fair cross section" requirement to
the composition of his petit jury, even though Taylor had expressly limited
its holding to the composition of the jury venire. '" The Teague Court held
that the petitioner could neither rely on Batson nor extend Taylor, because
to do so would allow him to invoke a new rule of constitutional law that
Claims Raised by State Prisoners:Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 324 (stating that Townsend, Fay, and Sanders "ushered in the
'Golden Age' of federal habeas for state prisoners"). But cf. James S. Liebman,
Apocalypse Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttack on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2065 (1992) (referring to the period from 1867 to 1891 as the
"Golden Age of federal prisoner habeas corpus review").
11. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 1, at 441.
12. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 381, 423-43 (1996) (summarizing legislative proposals in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s).
13. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977) (imposing a higher burden for
federal habeas petitioners whose claims were procedurally defaulted in state court); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (refusing to consider Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule claims on federal habeas); see also Jordan Steiker, HabeasExceptionalism, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1703, 1709 n.29 (2000) (noting that the Court "significantly retreated from the
landmark decisions of the early Warren Court that had secured robust habeas review of
federal claims brought by state prisoners").
14. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
15. Id. at 293.
16. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
17. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294 ("Petitioner's first contention is that he should receive
the benefit of our decision in Batson even though his conviction became final before Batson
was decided.").
18. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
19. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299 ("As we noted at the outset, Taylor expressly stated
that the fair cross section requirement does not apply to the petit jury.").
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had not been in effect at the time of his conviction.2" Absent limited
exceptions, new rules of constitutional law would not apply retroactively to
a state prisoner's federal habeas petition.2 1
Thus, Teague was ostensibly a case about retroactivity. In articulating
this non-retroactivity principle, however, Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion used language that suggested a more deferential standard of review
for state court legal determinations. The plurality opined that a decision
would be deemed to announce a new rule "if the result was not dictated by22
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."
Teague's impact on the proper standard of review for federal habeas
was not immediately clear, and courts and commentators recognized that
Teague was subject to two very different readings.23 Under the most
narrow reading, Teague simply prohibited federal courts from granting
habeas relief if the state prisoner's constitutional claim relied on a rule of
constitutional law that had not been in effect at the time of conviction.
Batson was a perfect example of a new rule. Not only did it announce a
rule that had never existed before, but the rule it announced expressly
overturned the rule that existed before. 24
Under the broader reading of Teague, however, federal habeas relief
would be unavailable if a state court applying federal law existing at the
time of the prisoner's conviction could reasonably conclude that the
prisoner was not entitled to relief. Habeas relief would be barred even if
the federal court's independent interpretation and application of existing
law would lead it to rule in the prisoner's favor. This reading of Teague
would constitute a marked change from Brown v. Allen's de novo standard
of review, and for that very reason the Teague opinion was widely
criticized.25 Many lower federal courts, however, adopted this broad
reading. 26
20. Id. at 295-96 ("Petitioner's conviction became final 2 1/2 years prior to Batson,
thus depriving petitioner of any benefit from the rule announced in that case."); id. at 299
("Petitioner nevertheless contends that the ratiodecidendi of Taylor cannot be limited to the
jury venire, and he urges adoption of a new rule. Because we hold that the rule urged by
petitioner should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, we decline to
address petitioner's contention.").
21. Id. at 310 ("Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have

become final before the new rules are announced."); id. at 311-12 (describing two
exceptions).
22. Id. at 301.
23. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 12, at 414-15 (noting that Teague could be read
for two different propositions).

24. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294-95 (describing how Batson had overruled Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
25. Friedman, supra note 1, at 823 (stating that Teague "slams shut the doors of the
habeas court[s]"); Yackle, supra note 12, at 415 & n. 116 (noting that the broad reading of
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C. The 1990s: A Tale of Two Teagues

In two decisions issued the term following Teague, the Supreme Court
seemed to adopt the more sweeping interpretation, effectively creating a
deferential standard of review for issues of pure federal law. A habeas
petition would be deemed to rely on a "new rule" under Teague unless "a
state court considering [the petitioner's] claim at the time his conviction
became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule ... was required by the Constitution. "27 Thus, the Court read
Teague to validate "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary
to later decisions." 2" None of these cases, however, directly addressed
whether Teague had effectively overruled Brown v. Allen.
In Wright v. West,29 the Court reexamined the meaning of Teague and
the proper standard of review for federal habeas. In fact, the Court
expressly amended its original grant of certiorari and instructed the parties
to brief the following issue:
In determining whether to grant a petition for writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court, should a federal court give deference to the state court's
application of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's case or
30
should it review the state court's determination de novo?
Despite the Court's apparent attempt to resolve this question once and
for all, Wright was inconclusive. Only three justices, led by Justice
Thomas, read Teague as establishing a more deferential standard of review.
According to Justice Thomas, "a federal habeas court must defer to the
state court's decision rejecting the [petitioner's] claim unless that decision
is patently unreasonable. 3 ' He reasoned: "[I]f a state court has reasonably
rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas petitioner under existing law,
then the claim seeks the benefit of a 'new' rule
3
cognizable on habeas under Teague. ,

. . .

and is therefore not

Teague "has evoked genuine alarm in the academic community" and citing articles).
26. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 800 (citing Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's
Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371
(1991)).
27. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (emphasis added).
28. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (citation omitted).
29. 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
30. Wright v. West, 502 U.S. 1021, 1021 (1991) (amending order).
31. Wright, 505 U.S. at 291 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
32. Id.
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Three other justices, led by Justice O'Connor (who had authored the
Teague plurality), made clear that federal habeas courts must review
questions of federal law and its application de novo, although it must do so
according to the law that exists at the time the conviction becomes final:
Teague did not establish a "deferential" standard of review of
state court determinations of federal law. It did not establish a
standard of review at all. Instead, Teague simply requires that a
state conviction on federal habeas be judged according to the law
in existence when the conviction became final. In Teague, we
refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules
of law, but we did not create any deferential standard of review
with regard to old rules."
Justice Kennedy cast a fourth vote in support of this narrower reading,
agreeing with Justice O'Connor that Teague did not impose a deferential
standard of review .3"
Neither the three-justice Thomas view nor the four-justice
O'Connor/Kennedy view was able to garner a majority from the two
remaining Justices. Justice White declined to address the standard of
review issue altogether. 35 Justice Souter did not explicitly address whether
Teague had modified Brown v. Allen's de novo standard, but his
description of Teague seemed somewhat more akin to Justice Thomas's
broader reading. Justice Souter noted that:
[O]ur cases have recognized that the interests in finality,
predictability, and comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence
may be undermined to an equal degree by the invocation of a rule
that was not dictated by precedent as by the application of an old
rule in a manner that was not dictated by precedent.36

33. Id. at 303-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) ("Teague did not establish a deferential
standard of review of state-court decisions of federal law.').
[T]he existence of Teague provides added justification for retaining de novo
review, not a reason to abandon it. Teague gives substantial assurance that
habeas proceedings will not use a new rule to upset a state conviction that
conformed to rules then existing. With this safeguard in place, recognizing the

importance of finality, de novo review can be exercised within its proper
sphere.
Id. at 309.
35. Id. at 297 (White, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 313 (Souter, J., concurring) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Accordingly, he read Teague to hold that, in order for a defendant to

obtain federal habeas relief, the "unlawfulness [of the conviction] must be
apparent."37 Even placing Justice Souter in the Thomas camp for headcounting purposes, Wright yielded a 4-4 tie.
Thus, Wright failed to resolve whether Teague's non-retroactivity
principle effectively imposed a deferential standard of review. Following

Wright, however, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts continued to
use language consistent with Justice Thomas's deferential version of
Teague.3"
D. AEDPA

To this point, only courts and commentators had spoken directly to the
question of whether federal habeas courts must afford deference to a state
court's interpretation or application of federal law. With the passage of
AEDPA, however, Congress weighed in. Section 104(3) of AEDPA,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 39

This language seemed to require federal habeas courts to defer to a
state court's interpretation and application of federal constitutional law as
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) (stating that federal habeas relief
is appropriate only if "reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his conviction
became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to rule in his favor")
(quotation marks and citation omitted); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997)
("[W]e will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state
court, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively
unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court."); Vuong v. Scott, 62
F.3d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The Teague principle seeks to validate good faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts ....

Thus, unless reasonable

jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to rule in his favor, we are barred from doing so now.")
(quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Steiker, supra note 13, at 1712 & n.51 (noting
"that lower federal courts have aggressively invoked the nonretroactivity doctrine as a basis
for denying relief (and in many cases, as a ground for not addressing the merits of a
petitioner's constitutional claim)").
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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long as the state court's decision was reasonable, instead of reviewing such
issues de novo as Brown had instructed. Nonetheless, many argued that
§ 2254(d)(1) maintained independent federal habeas review for issues of
federal constitutional law. 40 Others argued that to construe § 2254(d)(1) to
abrogate independent federal habeas review was unconstitutional. 4 Nearly

four years after AEDPA's enactment, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue.
II. WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR
The Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Williams v. Taylor42 addressed
two fundamental issues involving the standard of review for federal habeas.
First, it addressed for the first time the proper construction of § 2254(d)(1),
including whether or not § 2254(d)(1) abrogated de novo review of federal
legal issues. Second, it returned to the meaning of Teague, seven years
after Wright failed to resolve the issue.

A. The Williams Opinions
Mr. Williams had been sentenced to death for capital murder.43
Following his conviction, he brought a state habeas corpus petition alleging
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.44 When the Virginia
40. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 778-79 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J.,
dissenting) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts must undertake
independent, de novo review of state court habeas decisions on appeal. I am unwilling to
depart from this unbroken line of Supreme Court precedent, especially since the language of
§ 2254(d)(1), as amended, does not demand it."); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic
Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologiesof the Antiterrorismand Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 42-45 (1997) (predicting that
§ 2254(d)(1) will be read to codify the interpretation of Teague endorsed by Justice
O'Connor in Wright); Yackle, supra note 12, at 383 ("[Flederal adjudication remains
independent [under § 2254(d)(1)]; it is just that the question on which independent federal
judgment is brought to bear is whether, after adjudicating the merits of the claim, the state
court reached the correct conclusion."); see also Chen, supra note 1, at 540 & n. 16 (citing
articles).
41. Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: CongressionalControl of Jurisdictionand the
Futureof the FederalCourts-Opposition,Agreement, and Hierarchy,86 GEO. L.J. 2445,
2467-68 (1998); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An
(Opinionated)User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REv. 103, 131-32 & n.110 (1998); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2550 (1998).
See generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The
Quantityand Quality of DecisionmakingRequired ofArticle III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv.
696, 703, 836 (1998). For a description of the constitutional arguments, see infra Part lI.B.
42. 529 U.S. 362.
43. Id. at 368, 370.
44. Id. at 370.
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Supreme Court rejected his claim,4 5 he filed a habeas corpus petition in
federal district court pursuant to § 2254.46 The district court granted Mr.
Williams a writ of habeas corpus, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was not "contrary to" and did
not involve an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law
under § 2254(d)(1). 47 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, issuing three
opinions: one by Justice Stevens, one by Justice O'Connor, and a dissent
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 4 s Various permutations of Justices joined in
different portions of each opinion. Justice O'Connor's opinion garnered
the majority with respect to the proper construction of § 2254(d)(1)-in
particular, whether it limited independent federal habeas review for federal
legal issues.49 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to how § 2254(d)(1)'s standard of review applied to the particular
decision issued by the Virginia Supreme Court in Mr. Williams's case. 5"
1. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S MAJORITY

The O'Connor majority read § 2254(d)(1) to preclude federal habeas
relief unless one of two conditions were satisfied: (1) the state court's
decision rejecting the prisoner's constitutional claim was "contrary to...
clearly established Federal law," or (2) the state court's decision "involved
an unreasonableapplication of ...clearly established Federal law." 5
As to the first prong, a state court's decision is "contrary to"
established federal law when the state court "applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases." 52 The state court's decision is
also "contrary to" established law if it "confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from our precedent. ,53 "[I]n either of these two
scenarios, a federal court will be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1) because the
state-court decision falls within that provision's 'contrary to' clause." 54

45. Id. at 371-72.
46. Id. at 372.
47. Id. at 373-74.
48. Id. at 365-66.
49. Id. at 399-416. One footnote in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion did not
garner a majority, because Justice Scalia did not join the opinion as to that footnote. Id.
50. Id. at 367-99. See generally The Supreme Court 1999 Term-Leading Cases,
114 HARV. L. REV. 319-29 (2000) (describing the decisions in Williams).
51. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05 (O'Connor, J.).
52. Id. at 405.
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id.
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A state court's decision fails under the "unreasonable application"
prong of § 2254(d)(1) if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but
applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. "" With
respect to this prong, the Court made clear that a federal habeas court
could no longer reject a state court's interpretation or application of federal
constitutional law based simply on its de novo conclusion that relief should
have been granted. It explained: "[A] federal habeas court may not issue
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
Rather, that application must also be
erroneously or incorrectly.
unreasonable."56 In other words, "an unreasonableapplication of federal
law is different from an incorrectapplication of federal law." 57 Thus, the
O'Connor majority rejected the reasoning of a four-justice minority led by
Justice Stevens, who would have construed § 2254(d)(1) to maintain de
novo review by federal habeas courts.58
2. JUSTICE STEVENS'S MAJORITY
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion applying § 2254(d)(1) to
the particular decision issued by the Virginia Supreme Court in Mr.
Williams's case. The Court found that Mr. Williams's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was governed by the rule set forth in Strickland
v. Washington.5 9 Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance claim has two
counsel's conduct must fall
elements: (1) "deficient performance"; that is,
"below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "prejudice"; that
is, there must be a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different had counsel performed properly.'
In applying § 2254(d)(1), the Court scrutinized the Virginia Supreme
Court's opinion and found that it failed to pass muster for two reasons
related to the "prejudice" prong of the Stricklandtest. First, the state court
"mischaracterized" the Strickland rule because it incorrectly read two later
Supreme Court cases, Lockhart v. Fretwell6' and Nix v. Whiteside,62 as
55.

Id. at 407-08.

56. Id.at411.
57. Id. at 410.

58. Id. at 377-79, 388-90 (Stevens, J.). Although Justice Stevens's reasoning was
ultimately based on statutory construction, he noted serious constitutional concerns that
would result from a contrary reading. Id. at 378-79 ("A construction of AEDPA that would
require the federal courts to cede this authority to the courts of the States would be
inconsistent with the practice that federal judges have traditionally followed in discharging
their duties under Article III
of the Constitution.").
59. Id. at 390 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
60. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
61. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
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imposing an additional requirement for Strickland prejudice. 63 The
Supreme Court in Williams found that, contrary to the state 6court's
reasoning, Lockhart and Nix had not modified the Strickland test.
Second, Williams held that the Virginia Supreme Court's analysis of
prejudice was unreasonable because "it failed to evaluate the totality of the
available mitigation evidence" in assessing prejudice.6 5 Justice Stevens
noted that mitigating evidence, even if irrelevant to future dangerousness,
might still have influenced the jury's appraisal of Williams's moral
culpability. His opinion explained:
Mitigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the
jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut
the prosecution's death-eligibility case. The Virginia Supreme
Court did not entertain that possibility. It thus failed to accord
appropriate weight to the body of mitigation evidence available to
trial counsel.6 6
3. TEAGUE REVISITED
Williams also addressed the issue the Court had failed to resolve in
Wright: had Teague overruled Brown v. Allen's de novo standard of
review? Through the opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, a
majority of six justices rejected the broad reading of Teague urged by
Justice Thomas in Wright.67 Justice Stevens stressed that Teague was an
anti-retroactivity rule, not one that required deference to all "reasonable
good-faith interpretations" of federal law by state courts.6" Justice
O'Connor agreed, explaining that Teague allowed a federal court to grant
habeas relief where it "conclude[s] in its independent judgment that the
relevant state court had erred on a question of constitutional law or on a
mixed constitutional question." 69
62.
63.

475 U.S. 157 (1986).
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-93. Under the state court's reading of Lockhart and

Nix, a defendant must show not only that there is a reasonable probability of a different
outcome had counsel performed adequately, but also that counsel's performance impaired
the fairness of the proceeding. See id. at 393.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 397-98. Although Justice O'Connor concurred in Justice Stevens's
application of § 2254(d)(1), she also set forth her own application § 2254(d)(1), which was
not significantly different. She too noted that the state court's application of Strickland was
unreasonable because the state court's decision "reveals an obvious failure to consider the
totality of the omitted mitigation evidence." Id. at 416.
66. Id. at 398.
67. See id. at 383-84 (Stevens, J.); id. at 400-02 (O'Connor, J.).
68. Id. at 382-83 (Stevens, J.).
69.

Id. at 402 (O'Connor, J.).
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B. Williams's Impact on the Standard of Review for
Federal Habeas Corpus
The Williams case answered several important questions regarding the

standard of review for federal habeas challenges to state court convictions.
Its most significant impact involved AEDPA's statutory standard of review,
which precludes federal habeas relief unless the state court's decision on
that claim "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 7" The Williams court read this language to require a two-

pronged inquiry. First, the federal habeas court must ask whether the state
court decision was "contrary to" established law. The decision is contrary
to established law if it either (a) fails to apply the correct Supreme Court
rule for deciding the particular claim, or (b) arrives at a result different
from that reached in a "materially indistinguishable" Supreme Court case. 7
Second, the federal habeas court must ask whether the state court decision

"involved an unreasonable application" of established Supreme Court law.
Even if the state court ruling is incorrect-that is, even if a federal court
exercising independent judgment would reach a different conclusionfederal habeas relief is available only if the state court's application of
established Supreme Court law is unreasonable.7"
Requiring a federal habeas court to defer to a state court's reasonable
application of federal law, even if it conflicts with the federal court's
independent judgment, is a significant change from Brown v. Allen.73
70.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
71.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.
72.
Id. at 405. Williams gives little explicit guidance on how courts should assess
.unreasonableness." See Steiker, supra note 12, at 1728 ("[T]he most that can be said for
[Justice O'Connor's] opinion is that it affirms the difference between 'unreasonable' and
'incorrect' applications of federal law without exploring the distinction in any helpful
detail."). It did, however, emphasize that § 2254(d)(1)'s standard of review is an objective
test, not a subjective one. Williams expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding that a
state adjudication is unreasonable only if it applied federal law in a way that "'reasonable
jurists would all agree is unreasonable."' Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 (quoting Green v.
French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)). It found that this "'all reasonable jurists'
standard would tend to mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on a
subjective inquiry rather than on an objective one." Id. at 410.
73.
Professor Yackle has argued that § 2254(d)(1), even as construed by Williams,
does not actually "require federal courts to 'defer' to previous state court judgments."
Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. Rv.1731, 1749 & n. 111 (2000).
Rather, "section 2254(d)(1) operates on federal court authority to 'grant' applications for
habeas 'relief.'" Id. at 1750. This strikes me as a purely semantic distinction. Professor
Yackle is correct, of course, that § 2254(d)(1) does not contain any form of the word
"deference." But to the extent that a federal habeas court must deny "relief" based solely
on a prior state court ruling, it is essentially being required to "defer" to that state court
ruling. Because I see no meaningful difference between the two phrasings, I use both in this
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However, Williams's two-pronged approach is different from that urged by
some commentators, who have argued that § 2254(d)(1) enacts a "global
reasonableness" standard.74 In particular, Williams demonstrates that
reasonableness alone is not adequate under the "contrary to" prong of
§ 2254(d)(1). If a state court decision fails to apply the correct Supreme
Court rule, and is therefore "contrary to" established law, then it does not
matter whether the state court could have "reasonably" thought it was
applying the correct rule. Williams found that the state court had "erred in
holding that our decision in [Lockhart] modified or in some way supplanted
the rule set down in Strickland."75 The Court, therefore, concluded that
the Virginia Supreme Court had not "analyzed the ineffective-assistance
claim under the correct standard."76 At no point did the Court ask whether
it would have been "reasonable" to read Lockhart as modifying Strickland.
Williams also resolved whether Teague v. Lane constituted a judgemade standard of review or purely a rule of retroactivity. It rejected the
notion that Teague had imposed a deferential standard of review that
required federal habeas courts to defer to a state court's "reasonable goodfaith interpretations" of federal law.77 Teague prohibited only the
retroactive application of new rules; it did not impose a new standard of
review requiring deference to a state court's application and interpretation
of existing rules. The practical effect of this ruling, however, is unclear.
Now that Congress has spoken by enacting § 2254(d)(1), the continued role
of the judge-made Teague doctrine remains to be seen.78
Although Williams's impact on § 2254(d)(1) and Teague is
unquestionably important, the Court left open many critical issues
concerning the standard of review for federal habeas. In particular,
Williams did not confront the serious constitutional implications of a
deferential standard of review and its impact on the power of federal courts
under Article III." 9 Some have argued that federal courts must be able to
decide issues of federal law unencumbered by state court interpretations of
Article.
74. Chen, supra note 1, at 572-73.
75. 529 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 395.
77. Even after Williams, however, some lower federal courts have continued to
apply the broad version of Teague to preclude federal habeas relief unless there was no
reasonable reading of federal law that would justify denying relief. See, e.g., Burdine v.
Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 953-55 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), petitionfor cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2001) (No. 01-495).
78. See infra Part VI.
79. Steiker, supra note 13, at 1705 ("Notably absent in the majority's decision is
any discussion of constitutional limits surrounding congressional control of federal court
jurisdiction."); Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and
Scope of Review, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2001) (noting that Williams did not
consider whether imposing deferential review was constitutional).
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federal law because Article III vests in the federal courts "judicial power
[over]

. .

. cases

. . .

arising under this constitution [and] the laws of the

United States." 80 Others have argued that § 2254(d)(1)'s limited focus on
the law of the Supreme Court, rather than law developed in the federal
courts of appeals, forces lower federal courts to violate their obligation
under Article III to follow their own precedents: Even if the state court
flatly ignores precedent in the governing circuit, a federal habeas court

must defer unless that precedent has also been clearly established in the
United States Supreme Court. 8 Finally, some have suggested that
depriving federal habeas courts of independent review of legal issues could
constitute a violation of the Suspension Clause.82
Because Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Williams Court is based

quite explicitly on statutory construction, 3 such constitutional concerns
theoretically remain open questions. Surely, these constitutional concerns
will continue to be a fundamental part of the long-running debate on
whether federal habeas courts should defer to state courts on issues of
federal law. After Williams, however, § 2254(d)(1)'s deferential standard

of review is, as a practical matter, here to stay. Thus, the debate must
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 41, at 703,836
(arguing that Article III requires that federal courts decide legal issues "independently,
comprehensively, lawfully, finally, and effectually") (emphasis omitted); Metzler, supra
note 41, at 2540 ("I agree that Congress may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional
untruth."); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a ConstitutionalQuestion, 71 B.U. L. REV.
645, 646 (1991) ("The Constitution itself thus presumes parity among federal courts, but
disparity between federal and state courts-at least where the question is which court may
be given the last word on issues of federal law."). But see Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas
Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 888 (1998).
81. Jackson, supra note 41, at 2467-68.
In evaluating the scope of "clearly established" law, the lower federal courts
apparently must ignore final judgments entered by other district courts, or by
the federal courts of appeals. Do these requirements-the clearly established
standard and the rule that only Supreme Court decisions can meet that standard
-intrude on the federal courts' function to say what the law is?
Id.; Lee, supra note 40, at 131-32 ("If the 'Supreme Court only' clause of section
2254(d) requires district courts to make an independent determination about whether the
circuit has fairly interpreted Supreme Court case law, then it selectively suspends the
doctrine of stare decisis. This is a potential violation of Article III .... ").
82. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that an overly
broad reading of § 2254(d)(1) "would pose serious Suspension Clause difficulties"); Daniel
Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or a Dying Canary?, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 435,
438 n. 14 (1999) (book review) (noting that "AEDPA is extraordinarily far-ranging and
implicates constitutional provisions from Article III to the Suspension Clause and the First
and Fifth Amendments" and citing "unprecedented deference to state court factual and legal
findings" as one of "AEDPA's main judicial review features").
83. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (noting the "cardinal principle of statutory
construction"); see also id. at 407 (relying on "the logical and natural fit of the neighboring
.unreasonable application' clause").
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begin to shift to, or at least expand towards, the question of how federal
courts should defer to state court rulings on pure issues of federal law.
III. OPINION-DEFERENCE OR RESULT-DEFERENCE?

When a federal habeas court reviews a state court's "decision" under
§ 2254(d)(1), what aspect of that decision should be the focus of review?
Does the federal court review simply the state court's "result," by which I
mean the state court's ultimate conclusion that there is no remediable claim
under federal law? Or does it review the state court's "opinion," that is,
the actual legal reasoning provided by the state court in support of its
ruling?
The answer to this question will have a significant impact on how
§ 2254(d)(1)'s standard of review operates. If the federal habeas court
must defer to the state court's "result," then relief would be barred so long
as that result could be supported by some legal basis that is neither contrary
to, nor an unreasonable application of, established law. This would
essentially enact the broad reading of Teague that Justice Thomas endorsed
in Wright v. West." Under that approach, federal habeas relief is available
only if "reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his
conviction became final 'would have felt compelled by existing precedent'
to rule in his favor." 5 According to Justice Thomas, therefore, the actual
reasoning relied on by the state court is irrelevant. I refer to this reading
of § 2254(d)(1) as "result-deference."
If § 2254(d)(1) targets the state court's "opinion," then relief is barred
only if the state court's actual reasoning is neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of established law. This would be an intriguing
middle ground between independent review and the broad reading of
Teague espoused by Justice Thomas. Federal habeas review would target
the analytic soundness of the state court's interpretation and application of
federal law. If the state court's actual analysis identifies the correct rule of
federal law and applies it reasonably, then federal habeas courts may not
second-guess its ruling. If the state court's analysis fails to pass muster,
then the federal habeas court would conduct its traditional independent
review of the relevant legal issues. I refer to this reading of § 2254(d)(1)
as "opinion-deference."
I will also examine an important corollary to the question of whether
§ 2254(d)(1) requires opinion-deference or result-deference: How should
84. Wright, 505 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion) (Thomas, J.).
85. Graham, 506 U.S. at 467 (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488); see also O'Dell,
521 U.S. at 156 ("[We will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be
said that a state court, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted
objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court.").
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§ 2254(d)(1) apply if the state court issues no opinion explaining how it
interpreted and applied federal law? Because there would be no written
opinion to scrutinize, the possibilities are either: (1) a state court that fails
to articulate its reasoning receives no deference, meaning that a federal
habeas court may conduct independent review of the legal issues; or (2) a
state court that fails to articulate its reasoning will receive result-deference;
that is, the ruling would preclude federal habeas relief as long as it can be
supported by some legal basis that is neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of established law.
I conclude that § 2254(d)(1) should be read to target the legal
reasoning given by the state court, rather than its bare outcome. It should
limit federal habeas review only where the state court writes an opinion
that does an analytically sound job of adjudicating a prisoner's federal
claim on the merits. Consistent with the Supreme Court's bifurcated
reading of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams, a state court's reasoning would pass
muster when the state court identifies the established rule and reasonably
applies that rule to the facts.
A. Methodology
My approach to these issues concentrates on two inquiries that have
shaped prior efforts to conceptualize the role of federal habeas. The first
focuses on the individual and asks: to what extent does a particular model
of federal habeas protect the federal rights of a state defendant? Different
theories of habeas entail more or less enforcement of those rights by the
federal courts. At the less-enforcement end of the spectrum is Professor
Bator's "fair process" model, under which federal habeas affords relief
only where the defendant has been denied a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his or her federal claims in state court. 86 From the defendant's
standpoint, the only protection Professor Bator's model provides is to
ensure that he or she has access to fair process in state court. At the moreenforcement end of the spectrum is the "federal forum" model supported
by Professor Yackle87 and the "appellate" model urged by Professor
Friedman."8
These models generally allow state defendants to raise
86. See Bator, supra note 1, at 451.
87. Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 997
(1985) ("[I]t is essential that postconviction habeas be available to ensure the choice of a

federal forum . . ").
88. See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247, 253-54
(1988).
The Article's thesis is that the Court expanded the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus in Brown because the Court recognized that it no longer could shoulder
the burden on direct review of scrutinizing constitutional claims arising in state
criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the federal habeas courts were to act as
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substantive issues of federal law on federal habeas and to receive
independent review of legal questions by federal habeas courts. 9
The second inquiry focuses on the state system itself-how does a
particular model of federal habeas impact the behavior of state institutions
in enforcing federal rights? Debates over the proper scope of federal
habeas frequently questions whether a given theory of habeas will make
state courts more or less attentive to defendants' federal claims. Indeed,
some judges and commentators have argued that the very purpose of

federal habeas is to "deter" state courts from under-enforcing constitutional
rights.9

Following this tradition, my analysis of §2254(d)(1) undertakes these
same two inquiries. First, I explore how the choice between opiniondeference and result-deference impacts the scope of protection federal
habeas affords an individual with a federal claim. Second, I assess how

either reading of § 2254(d)(1) will affect the behavior of state courts in
their enforcement of federal rights.
It is equally important, however, to clarify what I am not doing. It is
not my goal to argue as a general matter what the proper role of federal
habeas should be, or as a specific matter whether federal habeas courts
should defer to state court rulings on pure questions of federal law.

Williams's construction of § 2254(d)(1) establishes that, at least for now,
federal habeas courts must defer to state court interpretations of federal
law. Thus, this Part aims to analyze and reconceptualize federal habeas in

light of § 2254(d)(1) and Williams, in the hope that it may shed some light
on how the new standard of review will operate. Also, my analysis of
surrogates for the United States Supreme Court through habeas review, in effect
exercising appellate jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings.
Id.
89. Another prominent model is the "innocence" model. Under this theory, first
articulated by Judge Friendly and later endorsed by Professors Hoffman and Stuntz, the
level of scrutiny varies depending on whether the defendant can make a viable showing that
he is innocent. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz,
Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 65, 69. For articles summarizing the
numerous "models" of federal habeas corpus, see Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1813
(1991); Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 983-1003 (2000); Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of
FederalHabeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 152-54 (1994); David McCord, Visions of
Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REv. 735, 743-786; Yackle, supra note 73, at 1756.
90. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with
established constitutional standards."); Joseph L. Hoffman, The Supreme Court's New
Vision of Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 175-85;
Lee, supra note 89, at 154; see also infra Part III.C.
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§ 2254(d)(1) is deliberately neutral on two of the more controversial issues
underlying the debate over the proper scope of federal habeas vis- -vis
state courts. First, I take no position on the constitutional implications of
federal habeas, either in terms of Article III or the Suspension Clause.
Second, I take no position on the question of parity; my arguments are not
based on any assumption about whether or not state courts are as good as,
better than, or worse than federal courts at enforcing federal rights. 9
B. Impact on Individual Defendants: Opinion-DeferenceEnsures that
Some Court Will Consider the Defendant's Claim in an Analytically
Sound Manner
From the defendant's standpoint, any post-Williams reading of
§ 2254(d)(1) provides less than the absolute right to raise federal claims de
novo on federal habeas. Opinion-deference, however, will ensure one (and
only one) independent adjudication of the defendant's claim that is
analytically sound under established law. 92 If the state court's reasoning
passes muster, then § 2254(d)(1) would bar federal habeas relief; a
defendant could not relitigate the issue on federal habeas because the state
court has already provided a sound adjudication of his or her federal claim.
However, if the state court's reasoning fails to correctly identify or
reasonably apply governing federal law, then § 2254(d)(1) would not bar
relief; a defendant would be entitled to independent review on federal
habeas because the state proceedings failed to provide an analytically sound
adjudication.
A result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1), on the other hand, would
not guarantee an analytically sound disposition of a defendant's federal
claims. Deferring to the state court's result, as opposed to its actual legal
analysis, means that a defendant's federal claim could be rejected even
though no court, state or federal, undertook the analysis required by the
Supreme Court for adjudicating such claims. Suppose that the state court

91. For some key articles debating "parity" between state and federal courts, see
Amar, supra note 80, at 646; Bator, supra note 1, at 506-12; Neuborne, supra note 1, at
1106; Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813
(1981) ("There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not provide a
'hospitable forum' in litigating federal constitutional questions."). See generally Lee, supra
note 89, at 155, 193 n. 174 (listing parity articles).

92. To be more precise, it will ensure that a diligent defendant will receive an
analytically sound adjudication of his or her federal claim on the merits. A defendant who
has procedurally defaulted his or her claim (and cannot show cause and prejudice for the
default) would still be precluded from a merits review on federal habeas. See Wainwright,
433 U.S. at 87-88 (requiring a defendant who procedurally defaults a claim in state court to
establish "cause and prejudice" in order to raise the claim on federal habeas).
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rejects a defendant's federal claim based on Ground A. Ground A,
however, is either contrary to or unreasonably applies clearly established
Supreme Court precedent, which dictates that the viability of the
defendant's claim depends on Ground B. Under opinion-deference, the
federal habeas court could independently assess whether Ground B supports
the constitutional claim, an inquiry that was never made in state court.
Under a result-deference approach to § 2254(d)(1), however, the federal
habeas court's inquiry would be limited to whether a court could have
reasonably denied relief because of Ground B. Accordingly, neither the
state court nor the federal court will have independently assessed whether
Ground B actually justifies denying the claim on the merits.
Here is a more concrete example. Imagine a defendant who claims
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. The state court
denies the claim on the basis that a defendant is only entitled to effective
assistance of counsel at trial, not on direct appeal. It is well-established, of
course, that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate
counsel.93 Under an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1), the federal
habeas court would find this state court decision "contrary to or an
unreasonable application of" established federal law, and proceed to
independently decide whether the defendant did or did not receive effective
assistance on appeal. Under a result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1),
however, the federal habeas court would be required to deny relief as long
as some court could reasonably conclude that the defendant received
effective assistance. In that situation, no court, state or federal, would
have made what is clearly the dispositive inquiry: whether appellate
counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance. Even if one assumes
"parity" between state courts and federal courts in deciding this issue for a
particular defendant, adequate enforcement of the defendant's federal rights
would seem to demand that some court has independently considered the
issue. Yet, under a result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1), it is possible
that a defendant will not receive independent consideration from any court.
1. "SUBSTANTIVE FAIR PROCESS"

Thus, an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) empowers federal
habeas courts to correct analytically unsound decisions by state courts
without entitling all defendants to de novo relitigation of federal legal
issues. Such a conception of federal habeas has yet to be articulated, either
by judges or academics. Ironically, the closest scholarly analogy may be
Professor Bator's "fair process" model, which is typically associated with
the bare minimum level of federal habeas protection. Professor Bator
93.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
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argued that federal habeas review should be available only where the state
court failed to afford the defendant "a process fairly and rationally adapted
to the task of finding the facts and applying the law. "94 Opinion-deference
would essentially add a substantive dimension to Bator's requirement of
fair process. It would embrace the notion that part of a fair adjudication is
sound legal analysis that identifies and reasonably applies the established
legal principles.
Professor Bator would likely object to this expansion of "fair
process." His fair process test allows relief only for the most egregious
state court deficiencies: a judge who was bribed, a defendant who was
tortured to plead guilty, a mob-dominated trial, or complete deprivation of
counsel." The federal habeas court's initial inquiry96would never target
"whether substantive error of fact or law occurred. ,
On closer inspection, however, "substantive" fair process is not
entirely inconsistent with Professor Bator's view of federal habeas. He
wrote: "[I]t is always an appropriate inquiry whether previous process was
whether the conditions and tools of inquiry
meaningful process, that is,
were such as to assurea reasonedprobabilitythat the facts were correctly
found and the law correctly applied."9' Where the state court fails to
identify the correct legal rule or fails to apply the correct rule in a
reasonable manner, the "probability" that "the law [was] correctly applied"
drops dramatically. The state court has, quite literally, failed to use the
proper "tools of inquiry."
Thus, truly "fair" process has a substantive element. It would be
hollow indeed to declare that a state court's disposition of a defendant's
federal claim was fair if that ruling was not even based on a sound reading
of federal law. An opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) recognizes
this substantive dimension by preserving independent federal habeas review
where the state court's decision did not reliably interpret and apply the
governing federal law principles.
2. ANALOGY: ABUSE OF DISCRETION REVIEW ON DIRECT APPEAL

An opinion-deference reading of §2254(d)(1) would be analogous to
deferential review in the context of a direct appeal. Under deferential
appellate review, how the lower court reaches its decision is critical. For
example, when an appellate court reviews a lower court's decision for
abuse of discretion, it must determine whether the lower court considered

94.
95.
96.
97.

Bator, supra note 1, at 455.
Id. at 455, 458.
Id. at 455.
Id.
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the appropriate factors.9" To do so, it must review the actual analysis given
by the lower court. If the lower court fails to consider the proper factors
or relies on impermissible factors, then that decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion, even if a lower court could have reached the same ultimate
result if it had applied the proper factors.99

Thus, abuse of discretion review indicates that where a lower court's
actual reasoning warrants reversal under a deferential standard of review,
it is irrelevant that the court's ultimate outcome could have been reached
by permissible reasoning. Likewise, where a state court's reasoning fails
to satisfy § 2254(d)(1)'s deferential standard of review, it should be
irrelevant that some reasonable, albeit incorrect, application of federal law
might have supported the outcome. The reason for this approach is
manifest: where a lower court's actual reasoning fails to pass muster, there
is no way to know whether it would have reached the same decision had it
based its decision on the correct factors. Justice O'Connor recognized this
very problem in Williams, stating: "It is impossible to determine, however,
the extent to which the Virginia Supreme Court's error with respect to its
reading of Lockhart affected its ultimate finding that Williams suffered no
prejudice." "'
3. COROLLARY: WHAT IF THE STATE COURT ISSUES NO OPINION?

Assuming that an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) is
adopted, it is not entirely clear how a federal habeas court should review a
state court that fails to write an opinion. It is possible that a state court that
issues only a summary order reached its conclusion in an analytically sound
manner. But it is also possible that such a court misunderstood the
governing legal standards or applied them unreasonably. Where the state
court issues a summary ruling, there is no way for the federal habeas court
to know how the state court interpreted and applied federal law. As a
practical matter, then, a state court that withholds its legal reasoning would
thwart the very review that an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1)
98. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979) ("The court
reviewing the decision for an abuse of discretion must determine 'whether the decision
maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether he relied upon an improper factor, and
whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. "') (quoting Note, Perfecting
the Partnership: Structuring the Judicial Control of Administrative Determinations of
Questions of Law, 31 VAND. L. REV. 91, 95 (1978)).
99. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: JudicialReview of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 54-55, 59 (2000) (citing Maurice
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 645-56 (1971) and Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and
Rights, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 169),
100. Williams, 529 U.S. at 414 (O'Connor, J.).
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would require-the federal habeas court would be unable to determine
whether the state court applied the correct legal rule or whether that
application was reasonable.
If § 2254(d)(1) is construed to ensure individuals an analytically sound
adjudication of their federal claims, then the safest course would be to
withhold deference where the state court fails to write an opinion setting
forth its legal reasoning. Without a written opinion, the federal habeas
court could never be sure that the state court's analysis correctly identified
and reasonably applied established federal law. Accordingly, independent
review of summary rulings would be required in order to guarantee one
sound adjudication of a defendant's federal claim.
This approach to § 2254(d)(1) is also consistent with deferential
review on direct appeal. Where a decision is to be governed by particular
factors, the failure of a trial court to articulate how it applied those factors
may constitute an abuse of discretion.' 0 ' In United States v. Taylor, the
Supreme Court reviewed a lower court's ruling under the Speedy Trial
Act. Such rulings, although they may be set aside only for an abuse of
discretion, are governed by specific statutorily-designated factors. " The
Court explained:
Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be
governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court
must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular
case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in
order to permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an
appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or
slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent .... ,0
101. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335-37 (1988).
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id. at 336-37; see also United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 141 F.3d
916, 919 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[M]eaningful appellate review for abuse of discretion is
foreclosed when the district court fails to articulate its reasoning."); Edwards v. City of
Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996) ("While normally we review a finding of
timeliness under the abuse of discretion standard, when the district court fails to articulate
reasons for its ultimate determination as to timeliness, we must review this factor de
novo."); cf. Nathan Katz Realty, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(reviewing agency action) ("That the Board has broad discretion is of no import. To state
the standard of review is not to offer a reason. If the Board chooses to exercise its
discretion, it must explain its action, and its explanation must reflect reasoned
decisionmaking."). It is true that, in the pure appellate context, an appellate court will
usually remand such a case so the lower court may reconsider the issue and articulate how it
applied the relevant factors. In the habeas context, such a remand would not be possible
because a federal habeas petition is an independent cause of action, not merely a direct
appeal from a state court judgment. Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that "[a] federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding cannot remand the case to the
state appellate court for a clarification of that court's opinion"). The treatment of summary
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Likewise, a state court's ruling on a defendant's federal constitutional
claim is governed by specific factors, namely, the specific rules of law
relevant to that constitutional claim. If the state court fails to indicate how
(or whether) it applied those rules of law, review is impossible.
C. Impact on State Courts: Opinion-Deference Gives State Courts an
Incentive to Examine FederalLaw Claims Carefully and Thoroughly

Another implication to consider in interpreting § 2254(d)(1) is how it
will influence state courts in their enforcement of federal rights. Adopting

an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) will create an incentive for
state courts to thoroughly consider federal claims raised by individuals in
its criminal justice system. This incentive exists because, if the state court
both identifies the correct rule of law and reasonably applies that rule, then
a federal habeas court will not be able to second-guess the state court's
ruling. The state court will know that, by doing an analytically sound job

of deciding a federal law claim, it will insulate its decision from federal
habeas review. The state court will also know that, if its opinion is
inadequate, then the federal court may consider the defendant's
constitutional claim independently and may effectively "reverse" the state

court's ruling by granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The notion that federal habeas influences how state courts act is not
new. As early as the 1960s, Justice Harlan noted the "deterrence
purpose" "4that federal habeas serves, and wrote that "the threat of habeas

serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent
with established constitutional standards." 0 5

This language has been

6

quoted often in Supreme Court opinions,1 and Justice Harlan's view of
habeas has gained support in scholarly circles as well. 0 7 According to this
lower court rulings in the appellate context is nonetheless instructive because it indicates
that a lower court decision cannot pass muster under a deferential standard of review unless
there is some way to determine how it applied the required factors.
104. Desist, 394 U.S. at 263, 265 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 262-63; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The primary justification given by the Court for extending the
scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is that it provides a quasi-appellate
review function, forcing trial and appellate courts in both the federal and state system to toe
the constitutional mark.").
106. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 648 (1993) (White, J.,dissenting);
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488; Teague, 489 U.S. at 306; see also Hoffmann, supra note 90, at
175-80 (arguing that Teague signals an endorsement of a "deterrence" theory of federal
habeas).
107. See Lee, supra note 89, at 154; see also Hoffmann, supra note 90, at 175-80
(arguing that the Supreme Court's precedent is consistent with a deterrence theory of
habeas); Hoffstadt, supra note 89, at 986 (describing "the deterrence model").
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"deterrence" theory, federal habeas operates as a much-needed "stick" that
threatens to vacate a state's criminal convictions if the state fails to enforce
federal rights. 0
Others, however, have questioned the impact of federal habeas review
on state court behavior. Chief Justice Rehnquist openly doubted whether
expanded habeas relief has any effect on state court enforcement of federal
rights, because state courts were already oath-bound to "their Article VI
duty to uphold the Constitution."" 9 Professor Bator argued that the
prospect of federal habeas review could actually have a detrimental effect
on the adjudication of federal claims in state court:
I could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of
responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is
so essential a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well,
than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots
will always be called by someone else." 0
It may be impossible to demonstrate as an empirical matter how
federal habeas relief ultimately impacts state courts' treatment of federal
constitutional claims. Analytically, however, it is fair to say that allowing
independent habeas review of all federal legal issues does not necessarily
provide the strongest incentive for state courts to address federal
constitutional claims thoroughly. Under Brown v. Allen's de novo
standard, federal habeas was all "stick" and no "carrot." State courts
received no benefit if they did an analytically solid job of interpreting
federal constitutional law but nonetheless under-enforced federal rights.
Where federal habeas courts reviewed such issues de novo, whether a state
conviction would stand was completely independent of how diligently the
state court had attempted to apply federal constitutional law. If the federal
court agreed that there was no constitutional violation, then the conviction
would stand. If it disagreed, then the conviction would be vacated. In
either case, it would not matter whether the state court undertook its task
carelessly, indifferently, thoroughly, or deliberately.
A result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) would have this same flaw.
Just like de novo review, how the state court actually interpreted federal
law would be irrelevant. As long as there exists some reasonable
108. Some have argued that, historically, federal habeas focused more on the
behavior of state executive officials than judges. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 80, at 649
("It is not clear that federal habeas was about federal court review of state judges, rather
than state executives ....

").

Because § 2254(d)(1) by its terms scrutinizes the decisions of

state courts, its effect on court behavior is the focus of this Article.
109. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636.
110. Bator, supra note 1, at 451.
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application of federal law supportive of the state court's ultimate result,
§ 2254(d)(1) would preclude relief, regardless of how the state court
reached its result. It would draw no distinction between (1) a state court
that diligently applied established federal law, and (2) a state court that
failed to do so but nonetheless lucked into a result that could have been
supported by a reasonable application of established law. Even a state
court that flagrantly ignored the governing law could thwart independent
federal habeas review."'1 Thus, a result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1)
would not create any additional incentive for state courts to do a thorough
job interpreting and applying federal law. Although it would surely make
it harder to obtain federal habeas relief, a result-deference reading would
do nothing to encourage state courts to adjudicate federal claims with
greater care.
1. MORE THAN JUST "DETERRENCE"

Unlike both result-deference and independent review, an opiniondeference reading of § 2254(d)(1) offers state courts a tangible "carrot" to
do an analytically adequate job interpreting federal law. By requiring the
federal habeas court to scrutinize the state court's actual reasoning, it
would reward those state courts that do a thorough job by barring federal
habeas relief if the state court's interpretation and application of federal law
is analytically sound.
In this way, the opinion-deference approach is consistent with a theory
put forth by Professor Althouse, who argues that state courts should be
"exploited, encouraged, and improved" in their capacity to protect federal
rights, and that doctrine defining the role of federal courts "can serve as a
mechanism for utilizing state courts and encouraging them to further the
enforcement of rights."' 12 If § 2254(d)(1) is read to reward state courts
when they interpret and apply federal law in an analytically solid manner,
then they will be encouraged to undertake this task more deliberately. This
encouragement may, in the long run, enhance the enforcement of federal
rights overall because state courts will play a more meaningful role in the
process. 1 3 Neither independent review nor result-deference creates such
111. This was also the case under Justice Thomas's reading of Teague. Because the
burden was on the habeas petitioner to show that "reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing
precedent to rule in his favor," Graham, 506 U.S. at 467, Justice Thomas's version of
Teague barred relief no matter how unsound the state court's actual reasoning.
112. Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. REv. 953, 956
(1991); see also Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1211
(1994) (noting that the "Myth of Parity" can act "as [an] incentive").
113. See Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, supra note 112, at 961.
[Als long as the state courts are good enough, even if they fall short of parity,
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an incentive for state courts." 4
The opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) also resonates with
"dialectical federalism," a theory of federal habeas first articulated by
Professors Cover and Aleinikoff." 5 This theory views federal habeas as
creating a dialogue between the state courts and the lower federal courts
about the proper interpretation and application of Supreme Court law as
applied to the state criminal justice system." 6 Under de novo review,
however, the federal habeas court held an institutional advantage because,
for any particular constitutional claim, the federal habeas court always had
the last word." 7 An opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) could be
read as shifting the terms of this dialogue to give state courts a stronger
incentive to participate. If the state court does an analytically solid job,
then the federal habeas court cannot overrule it. To adopt a resultdeference reading, however, would undermine this dialogue. As deference
would be required regardless of whether the state court did an analytically
solid job, there would be no incentive for the state court to participate in
this dialogue. Indeed, when many feared that Teague would be given the
broad interpretation later endorsed by Justice Thomas, commentators
warned that such a reading would cause a "loss of the federal-state
dialogue.""
the interest in enforcing rights supports allocating some federal questions to
state court in order.., to take advantage of the plentiful state courts, training
them to handle rights claims routinely, as they arise in context.
Id.; cf Ann Althouse, How to Build a SeparateSphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1488 (1987) (noting "the federal interest in effectively
functioning states").
114. See supra Part III.C.
115. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1.
116. Id. at 1048-54.
117. Although the state court would be bound to follow a federal court's granting of a
habeas writ in a particular case, state courts would retain the capacity to ignore the holdings
of lower federal courts in future cases. Id. at 1053 ("Clearly, state courts are not bound to
respect the doctrinal statements of the inferior federal tribunals insofar as they understand
those statements not to be compelled by the Supreme Court."); see also Ann Althouse,
Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 929, 941-42.
This dialogue differs from the dialogue of nine Supreme Court Justices or
twelve jurors, in which the participants must reach a consensus. The federal
judges simply speak second and override the state judges whenever they want,
regardless of what the state judges think. It may seem disingenuous to call this
a dialogue. Cover and Aleinikoff shore up the weak spot in their argument by
pointing out that the federal judge's view, although undeniably dictating the
outcome in any particular case, does not create a binding precedent (as a
Supreme Court decision would).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 1027 (1991). In
one sense, of course, any deference by federal habeas courts on pure issues of federal law
potentially undermines the role of federal courts in this dialogue. If federal habeas courts
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COROLLARY: WHAT IF THE STATE COURT ISSUES NO OPINION?

An opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) would encourage state
courts to do an analytically sound job of enforcing federal rights and, more
generally, to participate meaningfully in a federal-state dialogue about the
rights of defendants in the criminal justice system. This incentive occurs
precisely because deference is contingent on whether the state court's
actual reasoning passes analytical muster under § 2254(d)(1)." 9 It follows
that, to preserve this incentive, a state court that fails to write an opinion
articulating how it interpreted and applied federal law should not receive
deference under § 2254(d)(1). If summary decisions receive resultdeference, but written opinions receive more rigorous opinion-deference,
then a state court that explains its legal reasoning would only constrain the
ability of federal habeas courts to deny habeas relief pursuant to
§ 2254(d)(1). This would profoundly undermine any incentive for state
courts to openly participate in constitutional adjudication.
Discouraging state courts from issuing opinions explaining their legal
reasoning is not a desirable result. As numerous commentators have
recognized, opinions are an integral part of the legal process.' 20 To decide
cases without writing an opinion reduces judicial responsibility and impairs
both the development of law and the consistency of judicial decisionmaking. ' It also makes judges more susceptible to deciding cases based
are limited to asking whether the state court decision is analytically sound, as opposed to
whether it is correct, they might not be speaking directly on the relevant legal issues. Chen,
supra note 1, at 626 ("Because a federal habeas court's decision under § 2254(d)(1) is not
about the underlying substantive constitutional law decision by the state court, but involves a
determination of whether the latter's decision was reasonable, the federal court may not
pronounce what the law is."). However, it remains an open question whether a federal

habeas court must first address the legal issues independently, and only then apply the
deferential standard. See infra Part VI. This could allow them to still participate fully in
the dialogue, even if their ability to grant relief is constrained.
119. See supra Part III.C.
120. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,

388 (1978) ("By and large it seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication
are promoted by reasoned opinions."); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of
Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 (1981) ("The reasoned, published appellate opinion is
the centerpiece of the American judiciary's work."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959) (noting that providing
a "reasoned explanation" is "intrinsic to judicial action").
121. Chen, supra note 1, at 625 (noting that "explicit deliberation" by courts is
valuable for the development of legal principles and for judicial accountability); Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? OrDoes the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify JudicialDecisions Pose a GreaterThreat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REv. 757, 765-84 (1995) (describing the importance of judicial opinions to the
development of law, stare decisis, and the legitimacy of the judicial process); Reynolds &
Richman, supranote 120, at 575 ("Because opinions make law, these explanations must be

2001:1493 Reconceptualizing FederalHabeas Corpus

1523

on a general reaction to the type of case rather than on the actual merits of
the particular claim presented. Professors Reynolds and Richman have

noted that judges who can avoid writing precedential opinions are more
likely to rule based on such a "conditioned response. "122 Accordingly, to
encourage opinion-writing by state courts is to enhance those courts'

abilities to enforce federal rights, consistent with the general view of
federal courts expressed by Professor Althouse.'"

Making a written

opinion a prerequisite for deference under § 2254(d)(1) also bolsters the
dialectical view of federal habeas expressed by Professors Cover and
Aleinikoff. An opinion is the means by which a state court would
participate in a dialogue about federal rights; and therefore, by encouraging
124
state courts to issue such opinions, that dialogue will be enhanced.
D. FederalHabeas Under an Opinion-DeferenceReading of
Section 2254(d)(1)

For these reasons, whether § 2254(d)(1) bars federal habeas relief
should depend on the actual reasoning provided by the state court. If the

state court's reasoning is either "contrary to" or "involve[s] an
unreasonable application of" federal law, then the federal court is
"unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1)" 125 and must proceed to make an
independent assessment of the legal issues. The federal habeas court
should not inquire whether some reasonable application of the correct rule
of law could have justified denying relief.
Nor should a state court receive deference if it fails to provide any
legal analysis to support its ruling. In that situation as well, the federal
court should be free to decide the constitutional issues independently, free
readily accessible to interested persons.").
122. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 120, at 623-24 ("[T]here is a danger of a
judge developing a conditioned response to the surface characteristics of certain classes of
recurrent and annoying litigation. Requiring a judge to justify a decision to the public is
one way to minimize that danger.").
123. As a general matter, encouraging state courts to articulate their reasoning when
considering federal claims would also ameliorate other problems relevant to federal review
of state court rulings. As litigation in the Supreme Court over the 2000 presidential election
demonstrates, how a state court reaches its decision is often critical to whether the decision
passes muster under federal law. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (remanding for Florida Supreme Court to articulate the precise basis for
its decision). But cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (reversing despite the Florida
Supreme Court's subsequent explanation on remand).
124. Thus, adopting an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) would alleviate
two concerns articulated by Professor Chen, who argued in a pre-Williams article that
§ 2254(d)(1) "might diminish state courts' incentive to fully articulate their reasoning" and
"reduce-] the opportunity" for a dialogue between federal and state courts. Chen, supra
note 1, at 625, 627.
125. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404, 406.

1524

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

from § 2254(d)(1)'s deferential standard. A federal habeas court should
not be forced to speculate whether some reasonable, although incorrect,
interpretation or application of federal law might have supported the state
court's summary result.
This opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) strikes a sensible
balance between Brown v. Allen's de novo review and Justice Thomas's
result-deference review. "26 Although it no longer assures a defendant the
absolute right to relitigate federal claims via a federal habeas petition, it
does ensure that a defendant will receive one analytically sound disposition
of those claims. It also gives state courts a real incentive to take their
obligation to enforce federal rights seriously, whereas a result-deference
reading could actually encourage state courts to address federal claims
summarily.
IV. DOES EXISTING LAW SUPPORT AN OPINION-DEFERENCE READING
OF SECTION 2254(d)(1)?

To this point, my analysis of § 2254(d)(1) has been, for lack of a
better word, academic. However persuasive (or unpersuasive) one finds
this analysis, a court deciding how § 2254(d)(1) should be applied will do

more than merely decide which reading it prefers as a matter of policy or
theoretical coherence.' 27

Courts will analyze existing case law on

126. Cf. Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (noting that the
scope of federal habeas involves a "delicate balance" between the states and the federal
courts).
127. To date, the federal appellate courts have given conflicting indications with
respect to whether § 2254(d)(1) requires opinion-deference or result-deference. For cases
endorsing result-deference, see Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2001)
("The statute compels federal courts to review for reasonableness the state court's ultimate
decision, not every jot of its reasoning."); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir.
2001) ("Nowhere does [§ 2254(d)(1)] make reference to the state court's process of
reasoning."); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("[T]he criterion
of a reasonable determination for purposes of § 2254(d) is not whether the state court
decision is well reasoned, but whether the determination is at least minimally consistent with
the facts and circumstances of the case.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hennon,
109 F.3d at 335 ("It doesn't follow that the criterion of a reasonable determination is
whether it is well reasoned. It is not. It is whether the determination is at least minimally
consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.").
For cases endorsing opinion-deference, see Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 871 (7th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997):
By posing the question whether the state court's treatment was "unreasonable,"
§ 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to take into account the care with which the
state court considered the subject ....When the subject is painted in shades of
grey, rather than in contrasting colors, a responsible, thoughtful answer reached
after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment.
Id.; see also Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) ("AEDPA imposes a
requirement of deference to state court decisions, but we can hardly defer to the state court
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§ 2254(d)(1) and examine the text and structure of AEDPA in order to
discern Congress's intent in enacting the new standard of review. Such an
analysis also supports the proposition that § 2254(d)(1) requires deference
only to the actual reasoning relied on by the state court, as opposed to its
bare result. Opinion-deference fits comfortably with both the Supreme
Court's decision in Williams and with the text and structure of AEDPA
itself.
A. Williams v. Taylor
Williams does not expressly address whether § 2254(d)(1) targets the

state court's actual legal reasoning or merely its bare result. However, the
approach of the Williams Court is consistent only with a reading of
§ 2254(d)(1) that requires opinion-deference.

This is borne out by the

Court's treatment of both prongs of the § 2254(d)(1) analysis. In applying
the "contrary to" prong, Williams held: "A state-court decision will
certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

on an issue that the state court did not address."); Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 730-31
(6th Cir. 2001):
Because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not even identify in its opinion that
Doan had a federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury that considers
in its deliberations only the evidence presented against him at trial, the
"unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1) does not govern our analysis.
The Ohio Court of Appeals did not, as the Supreme Court [in Williams] defined
an unreasonable application, correctly identify the governing legal principle
only to unreasonably apply that principle to the particular facts of the case at
hand. On the contrary, the Ohio Court of Appeals completely failed to identify
Doan's Sixth Amendment rights in its analysis.
Id. (citations omitted); Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2001):
Under Williams, we must discern "the correct legal rule" according to clearly
established Supreme Court law and then look to see if the state appellate court
applied that rule in Campbell's case ....By applying the "adverse effect"
standard to the facts of Campbell's case instead of the "correct legal rule" set
forth in Holloway, the California Court of Appeal rendered a decision that was
"contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme Court law.
Id.; Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[W]e cannot say that the
Delaware Supreme Court took into account controlling Supreme Court decisions . ...
Hence, we exercise pre-AEDPA independent judgment on the duplicative aggravating
circumstances claim."); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 926-27 (11th Cir. 1998):
[Tihe [state] court contravened the Supreme Court's command that evidence
must be analyzed collectively, not item by item, for Bagley materiality. The
DeKalb County circuit court, the only Alabama court to have written on this
point, analyzed each letter for its likely individual effect on the outcome of the
trial, but did not analyze the letters' collective effect. This piecemeal approach
is "contrary to" clearly established federal law; therefore, we must
independently consider the merits of Neelley's claim,
Id. (citations omitted).
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applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. 128
This inquiry necessarily targets the state court's reasoning, not merely its
outcome, because what "rule" a state court "applie[d]" can only be
determined by reference to the legal analysis it provides." 9
Indeed, the Court gave an example involving the "rule" established by
Strickland v. Washington. 3° Under Strickland, a lawyer provides
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel if his or her deficient
performance causes a "reasonableprobability that

. . .

the result of the

proceeding would have been different."'' Applying § 2254(d)(1) to the
Strickland example, the Williams Court reasoned:
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not
established by a preponderanceof the evidence that the result of
his criminal proceeding would have been different, . . . a federal

court will be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1) because the statecourt decision falls within that provision's "contrary to"
clause. 132
In other words, if established Supreme Court law requires standard A
(reasonable probability), but the state court incorrectly uses standard B
(preponderance of the evidence), then § 2254(d)(1) does not bar
independent federal habeas review. The only way to know whether the

state court applied standard A or standard B is to examine the state court's
actual legal analysis. Moreover, the Williams Court did not indicate that a

state court that had applied an incorrect standard could still preclude
federal habeas relief as long as it could have reasonably denied relief under
the correct standard. Rather, once the federal court concludes that the state
court's actual reasoning failed to apply the governing rule of law, federal
habeas review is "unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1)." 133 This approach flatly

contradicts a result-deference reading.
128. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
129. Under Williams, a state court decision is also "contrary to" established law if
the state court reaches a result that is different from a "materially indistinguishable"
Supreme Court case. Id. at 406. Although this inquiry admittedly scrutinizes the ultimate
result reached by the state court, it does not suggest that § 2254(d)(1) defers to "results"
rather than "opinions." As binding precedent, such a case would necessarily constitute a
"rule" that those "materially indistinguishable" facts amount to a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, a result that is contrary to an indistinguishable Supreme Court case could
never be reached by a reasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent
because that precedent would mandate the opposite result.
130. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
131. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
132. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 406.
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With respect to the "unreasonable application" prong, Williams held
that "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry
should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established
federal law was objectively unreasonable."' 34 The Court did not require
federal courts to ask whether some objectively reasonable application of
federal law, not articulated or relied on by the state court, might support
the state court's conclusion. Thus, in applying § 2254(d)(1), Williams
concluded that "[t]he Virginia Supreme Court's own analysis of
prejudice"' 35 was unreasonable because it "failed to evaluate the totality of
the available mitigation evidence." 36 In particular, the state court's
opinion "did not entertain [the] possibility" that "[m]itigating evidence
unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury's selection of penalty."' 37
The Williams Court neither asked whether some reasonable analysis might
have supported the state court's ultimate conclusion, nor did it inquire
whether a state court that had evaluated the available mitigation evidence
could reasonably reject Williams's ineffective assistance claim. It surely
did not suggest that every objectively reasonable court would conclude that
the attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence was prejudicial under
the circumstances presented in Williams. Rather, it found that the
particular reasoning on which the state court actually based its conclusion
was unreasonable.
In addition, an opinion-deference reading is supported by the Williams
Court's bifurcation of § 2254(d)(1) into a rule-identification prong
("contrary to") and a rule-application prong ("unreasonable application
of"). Federal habeas courts do not defer to a state court's reasonable but
incorrect identificationof the established rule, but they must defer to a state
court's reasonable but incorrect applicationof the established rule.' 38 This
further suggests that § 2254(d)(1) focuses not on the bare outcome, but
rather on the process by which the state court interprets and applies federal
law. That process requires state courts first to get the rule right and then to
reasonably apply it.
Also confirming this reading is Williams's recognition that there is still
a place for federal habeas review that is "unconstrained" by
§ 2254(d)(1). 3 9 In other words, federal habeas review is now a two-step
process: first, the federal habeas court must ask whether § 2254(d)(1) bars
relief (which is itself a two-step process); second, if § 2254(d)(1) does not
bar relief, then the court must proceed to an "unconstrained" consideration
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 398.
See supra Part II.B.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406.
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of the merits of the petitioner's claim. However, if § 2254(d)(1) required
deference to the bare result reached by the state court, then the first step
would be so onerous that there would be no need for a second step. If the
state court's rejection of a federal claim could not be justified by any
reasonable application of federal law, then that claim is necessarily
meritorious-there would be no need for a separate "unconstrained"
review. Thus, Williams's understanding that "unconstrained" federal
habeas review is required when a state court's ruling fails to pass muster is
fundamentally inconsistent with a result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1).
It follows from Williams that when a state court neglects to articulate
the reasoning underlying its resolution of a petitioner's claim, its decision
is not entitled to any deference. The fact that Williams closely scrutinized
the Virginia Supreme Court's actual legal analysis strongly indicates that
state courts should not be able to avoid such scrutiny by withholding their
legal reasoning. To hold otherwise would, as explained above, encourage
14
state courts to issue summary opinions with no legal analysis. 1
Therefore, in light of Williams, § 2254(d)(1) must be read to bar habeas
relief only where the state court articulates a legal basis for its ruling that
4
reasonably applies the established rule of constitutional law. ' '
B. AEDPA
Any statutory analysis of § 2254(d)(1) will inevitably attempt to divine
Congress's intent in enacting that provision. Unfortunately, as many have
recognized, AEDPA generally and § 2254(d)(1) specifically are not welldrafted and fail to reflect clearly what Congress intended.142 There are,
however, inferences that may be drawn from the text and structure of
§ 2254(d)(1). Most important to the opinion-deference versus resultdeference debate is the fact that the statute requires deference only where
the defendant's claim has been "adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate
court.

"1

43

140. See supra Part III.C.2.
141. Moreover, in reaching its conclusion that the state court's opinion was
unreasonable, Williams emphasized the fact that the state court's opinion "failed even to
mention the sole argument in mitigation that trial counsel did advance," and "did not
entertain [the] possibility" that certain mitigating evidence might have altered the jury's
choice of punishment. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. If a state court's failure to mention one
facet of a claim renders its ruling unreasonable, then a fortiori, a state court's failure to
provide any analysis must be unreasonable as well under § 2254(d)(1).
142. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336 ("[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the
[AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."); Chen, supra note 1, at 56
(noting "the poor drafting of [§ 2254(d)(1)]"); Yackle, supranote 12, at 381 ("The new law
is not well drafted.").
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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This requirement supports an opinion-deference reading for several
reasons. First, the fact that § 2254(d)(1) is contingent on the state court
having adjudicated the claim on the merits suggests that its purpose relates
to the adequacy of that merits-adjudication. 1" A result-deference reading
of § 2254(d)(1) would review the state court's merits-adjudication only in
the most superficial sense. In reality, the soundness of the state court's
analysis of the merits would be irrelevant, so long as some reasonable basis
for denying relief can be conjured up after the fact. An opinion-deference
reading, on the other hand, would target the adequacy of the state court's
"adjudication on the merits" by scrutinizing the analytical soundness of that
adjudication.
Second, it is fair to read the "adjudicated on the merits" requirement
as itself requiring the state court to articulate its reasoning. It has long
been recognized that a written opinion explaining the court's reasoning is a
' There is every reason to
traditional part of constitutional adjudication. 45
think that issuance of an opinion explaining the state court's reasoning is
part of what Congress wanted state courts to do in "adjudicat[ing]" a
defendant's constitutional claims "on the merits. "146
Finally, the "adjudicated on the merits" requirement refutes two
theories that might otherwise be invoked to support a result-deference
reading of § 2254(d)(1). This requirement is fundamentally inconsistent
with the theory that § 2254(d)(1) reflected Congress's desire to enact
Justice Thomas's version of Teague. 47 Under Justice Thomas's reading,
Teague could bar relief regardless of whether the state court had
adjudicated the defendant's federal claim on the merits. Because Justice
144. See Yackle, supra note 12, at 420-21 ("An 'adjudication' is not a result (a
disposition), but a process by which a result is reached.").
145. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 120, at 575 ("The reasoned, published
appellate opinion is the centerpiece of the American judiciary's work."); Wechsler, supra
note 120, at 15-16 (noting that providing a "reasoned explanation" is "intrinsic to judicial
action").
146. Hameen, 212 F.3d at 248.
[We cannot say that the Delaware Supreme Court took into account controlling
Supreme Court decisions. This point is critical because under the AEDPA the
limitation on the granting of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is only
"with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings." Hence we exercise pre-AEDPA independent judgment ....
Id.; see also Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting one
"approach would find that unexplained, summary dismissals of federal claims are not
'adjudicat[ions] on the merits"' and stating that this approach is consistent with "the view of
at least six justices in Williams v. Taylor that the substance of the state court decision should
be examined in order to determine which clause of § 2254(d)(1) to apply and whether the
state court decision was 'contrary to' or involved an 'unreasonable application of' federal
law") (footnotes omitted).
147. See Yackle, supra note 12, at 415 ("[S]ome, I dare say, will read [§ 2254(d)(1)]
to endorse Justice Thomas' twist on Teague.").
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Thomas's Teague opinion was derived from an expanded notion of
retroactivity, it barred relief even if the state court had never reached the
merits. 48
Likewise, the "adjudicated on the merits" requirement is inconsistent
with the theory that federal habeas corpus is designed to remedy only
flagrant constitutional violations. This is, of course, a theory of limited
federal habeas that some have espoused.' 49 Whatever the merits of this
view of federal habeas, it is not one that § 2254(d)(1) can be coherently
read to support. If it were truly the case that federal habeas is designed
only to remedy obvious constitutional violations, then it would make no
sense to limit deference, as § 2254(d)(1) does, to cases where the state
court actually adjudicated the merits.
V. CRITIQUES OF OPINION-DEFERENCE

For the reasons I have explained above, §2254(d)(1) should be read to
require deference only where the state court has written an opinion that
correctly identifies the established rules of federal law and reasonably
applies them. I will now address some of the criticisms that either have
been or will likely be lodged against an opinion-deference reading of
§ 2254(d)(1).
A. Judge Posner's Critique
Judge Posner addressed some of the issues relevant to the opiniondeference versus result-deference debate in Hennon v. Cooper, in which
the court was called upon to decide if § 2254(d)(1) applies where the state
court's discussion of the petitioner's federal claim is "perfunctory. "15 He
endorsed a result-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1), holding that even an
inadequate state court ruling would bar relief if the result is "minimally
consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case."' 5' Judge Posner

148. Cf. Yackle, supra note 73, at 1755 (implying that Teague applied regardless of
whether there was an adjudication on the merits).
149. See, e.g., Wright, 505 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that
federal habeas corpus is intended "only to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
150. 109 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. Id. at 335 ("It doesn't follow that the criterion of a reasonable determination is
whether it is well reasoned. It is not. It is whether the determination is at least minimally
consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case."). But see Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871
("By posing the question whether the state court's treatment was 'unreasonable,'
§ 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to take into account the care with which the state court
considered the subject.").
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expressly rejected the argument that "the criterion of a reasonable
determination is whether it is well reasoned":152

[That reading of § 2254(d)(1)] would place the federal court in
just the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts that the recent
amendments are designed to end. It would be less appropriate
than in the parallel area of administrative review, where the court
can remand the case to the administrative agency for a better
articulation of its grounds. A federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding cannot remand the case to the state appellate court for
a clarification of that court's opinion; all it can do is order a new
trial, though the defendant may have been the victim not of any
constitutional error but merely of a failure of judicial
articulateness. 53
'
Judge Posner's analysis makes two points relevant to the opinion-deference
versus result-deference debate. First, he suggests that even an opiniondeference reading would give federal habeas courts too much license,
contrary to AEDPA's goal of liberating state courts from "tutelary"
supervision by federal courts.' 54 Second, he asserts that, because the
federal habeas court may not remand for clarification of the state court's
reasoning, a habeas petitioner might get relief without even establishing a
constitutional violation."'
The second point is the most fundamentally flawed. Interpreting
§ 2254(d)(1) to bar relief only when the state court articulates its reasoning
would not allow a defendant to obtain habeas relief simply by showing a
"failure of judicial articulateness" rather than an actual constitutional
violation. To obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner must always prove a
violation of federal law.' 56 The only issue under § 2254(d)(1) is whether a
state court's prior ruling should operate to completely bar federal courts
from even considering a prisoner's constitutional claim. Thus, a "failure
of judicial articulateness," standing alone, will never be grounds for
granting relief. It may, however, prevent a state court from enjoying the
152. Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994) ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless ... [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States .... ") (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (providing that
federal courts "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States") (emphasis
added).
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automatic bar to relief that would have applied if the state court had
articulated a reasonable basis for rejecting the prisoner's claim.
Judge Posner's reliance on Congress's apparent desire to eliminate the
"tutelary relationship" between the state courts and federal habeas courts is
also insufficient. To be sure, § 2254(d)(1) (as construed by Williams)
affords more deference to state courts than Brown v. Allen did, but the
question is, how much deference? It is not enough to say that AEDPA was

motivated in part by a desire to make federal habeas courts defer to state
courts and, therefore, the statute must be construed at every turn to
maximize the amount of federal deference." 7 Indeed, Professors Tushnet

and Yackle have identified the dangers in giving too broad a reading to a
statute that, like AEDPA, was motivated by such a symbolic purpose.158
Thus, the challenge facing courts after Williams is to delineate the
circumstances under which a state court ruling should completely preclude

federal habeas courts from deciding pure issues of federal law.

As

explained above, the most coherent and sensible approach is that §

2254(d)(1) precludes relief only where the state court actually issues an
opinion that reasonably applies the established rule of constitutional law.

Expanding on Judge Posner's concern that an opinion-deference
reading of § 2254(d)(1) would place federal habeas courts in "tutelary"
supervision over state courts, some federal courts have suggested that there

is something inherently unseemly about scrutinizing a state court's actual
reasoning. One court recently stated:
Telling state courts when and how to write opinions to

accompany their decisions is no way to promote comity.
157. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 40, at 47 (warning that courts should not simply
"embed Congress's mood in the statute books"); Lee, supra note 41, at 136.
Of course, the AEDPA largely owes its existence to long-standing Republican
dissatisfaction with lower federal courts' general treatment of habeas petitions
from state prisoners . . . . It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume
that every question of interpretation concerning the AEDPA must automatically
be resolved in favor of the construction that treats petitioners most harshly.
Id. In fact, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this kind of sweeping interpretive
approach in the context of another AEDPA provision. In response to the state's argument
that AEDPA precludes an evidentiary hearing even if the federal habeas petitioner had
diligently sought to develop a record in state court, the Court wrote: "We are not persuaded
by the Commonwealth's further argument that anything less than a no-fault understanding of
the opening clause is contrary to AEDPA's purpose to further the principles of comity,
finality, and federalism." Williams, 529 U.S. at 436. Noting that the scope of federal
habeas involves a "delicate balance," the Court found that "[it is consistent with these
principles to give effect to Congress' intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in
federal habeas corpus, while recognizing the statute does not equate prisoners who exercise
diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not." Id.
158. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 40, at 4 ("Real laws must take consequences into
account, and, we suggest, symbolic statutes rarely do so in a sensible way.").
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Requiring state courts to put forward rationales for their
decisions so that federal courts can examine their thinking
smacks of a "grading papers" approach that is outmoded in the
post-AEDPA era.' 59
The notion that federal habeas courts cross into forbidden territory
when they "examine the[] thinking" of state courts is unfounded. At the
very least, this concern is impossible to reconcile with the Supreme Court's
decision in Williams, which subjected the reasoning of the Virginia
Supreme Court to extremely thorough examination. " More importantly,
an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) does not in fact require state
courts to write opinions a certain way. They remain free to write opinions
however they choose (or not at all). Opinion-deference simply offers state
courts a tangible benefit if they do write an opinion that soundly interprets
and applies governing federal law.
AEDPA itself demonstrates that there is nothing wrong with making
reduced federal habeas scrutiny contingent on a demonstration that the
state's enforcement of federal rights is adequate. AEDPA's capital
punishment provisions, for example, constrain the latitude that federal
courts have in reviewing state death sentences, provided that a state "opts
in" by providing enhanced protections for capital defendants, such as the
appointment of counsel for state collateral review. 6 ' In other words, if a
state shows a serious commitment to handling federal law claims itself,
then Congress will limit the degree of intrusion on federal habeas. An
opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) could be viewed as a similar
program to limit federal habeas review where the state system has done an
adequate job of adjudicating the individual's federal claims. Like the
capital punishment provisions, § 2254(d)(1) gives state courts a concrete
incentive to improve their treatment of federal claims in the context of their
criminal justice system.
Therefore, far from subjugating the state courts, an opinion-deference
reading of § 2254(d)(1) will likely bolster the position of state courts by
encouraging them to deliberately consider questions of federal law that
impact the criminal justice system.1 62 The more that state courts issue wellreasoned opinions on federal law issues, the more they will be accepted as
159. Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., No. 00-11105, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 372
at *24 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2002) (citing Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335); see also Santellan, 271
F.3d at 193 ("[W]e are determining the reasonableness of the state court's decision, not
grading their papers.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312

("[Wie have no power to tell state courts how they must write their opinions.") (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

160. See supra Parts II & IV.A.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (Supp. V 2000); see also Yackle, supra note 12, at 393.

162. See supra Part III.C.

1534

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

co-equal interpreters of federal law. But when state courts summarily
reject federal constitutional claims, it creates an appearance that they are
giving such claims short shrift. The fact that there is such a vigorous
debate over
"parity" demonstrates that many hold this perception of state
63
courts. 1

B. The "Presumption" Critique
A critic of opinion-deference might also make the following argument:
Even if the state court's "opinion" would not pass muster under
§ 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court should presume that the state court
would have adopted whatever reasonable reading of federal law would have
supported its ultimate outcome. Such a presumption would mandate a
result-deference approach to § 2254(d)(1). It would require federal habeas
courts to inquire whether there exists any reasonable reading of established
law that could support the state court's ruling and then assume that the state
court would have adopted that reasoning if it had been aware of it.
This presumption is unwarranted for a number of reasons. As an
initial matter, it has no textual support. The federal habeas corpus statute
creates presumptions in other contexts," 6 and yet nothing in § 2254(d)(1)
suggests a congressional intent to impose such a presumption for purposes
of that provision. But this presumption theory has far more troubling
implications. Obviously, where the state court's dismissal of the
defendant's claim is the correct result, § 2254(d)(1) is irrelevant because
the defendant would not prevail even under independent federal review.
But where the state court's dismissal is not only incorrect, but is based on
analytically unsound reasoning, the question is whether the federal habeas
court should presume that the state court would have adopted a reading of
federal law that, although incorrect, would have been a reasonable
application of established federal law. Such a presumption would treat
state courts as inherently hostile to the enforcement of federal rights,
presuming that they would adopt any reasoning that would excuse them
from enforcing federal norms. In other words, federal habeas courts would
be required to assume that state courts would do all they can to avoid
enforcing federal rights. This hardly treats state courts as co-equal
interpreters of federal law.' 65
163. See generally Lee, supra note 89, at 193 n. 174 (listing articles discussing
parity).
164. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. V 2000) ("[A] determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall
have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.") (emphasis added).
165. C. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112 (stating that federal courts should give "great weight
to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary") (emphasis added).
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C. The Epistemological Critique
Finally, an opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1) might be subject
to a criticism of federal habeas that was first articulated by Professor Bator
in response to Brown v. Allen. He argued against broad federal habeas
review of state convictions on the ground that there is no way to know for
sure whether any court has truly reached the "correct" resolution of a legal
claim. He wrote:
Assuming that there "exists," in an ultimate sense, a "correct"
decision of a question of law, we can never be assured that any
particular tribunal has in the past made it .... Surely, then, it
is naive and confusing to think of detention as lawful only if the
previous tribunal's proceedings were "correct" in this ultimate
66
sense. 1
In other words, given that we can never conclusively determine whether
the state court or the federal habeas court actually has the "right answer"
be a compelling reason for
regarding a particular claim, there must
67
ruling.1
initial
court's
state
upsetting the
Bator's surprisingly post-modern 6 ' sensibility actually supports an
opinion-deference reading of § 2254(d)(1). Even if we can never truly
know whether the federal habeas will reach the "correct" result, we should
be particularly wary of the state court's conclusion where it fails either to
identify the governing rule of law or to reasonably apply that rule to the
facts of the case. In that situation, we should allow independent federal
habeas review not because we are certain that the federal court will reach
the right result, but because the state court's inability to articulate an
analytically sound basis for its ruling means that the federal habeas court is
more likely to reach the right result.
VI. REMAINING ISSUES

In exploring whether § 2254(d)(1) targets the state court's "opinion"
or the state court's "result," I have attempted to address one aspect of how
the new deferential standard of review for federal habeas will operate.
166. Bator, supra note 1, at 447.

167. See id. ("[T]he concept of 'freedom from error' must eventually include a
notion that some complex of institutional processes is empowered definitively to establish
whether or not there was error, even though in the very nature of things no such processes
can give us ultimate assurances . .

").

168. Cf. Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking The Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
29, 64 (1994) (noting "the post modern claim that there is no objective right answer").
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Numerous thorny questions remain, however, and I will briefly flag three

of them here.
One outstanding issue is the sequence that a federal court should
follow in reviewing a state court decision under § 2254(d)(1). Specifically,
should the federal court first address the federal claim independently and
second ask whether the state court's decision bars relief under
§ 2254(d)(1)? 169 Or may it immediately ask whether the state court's
decision passes muster and, if so, deny relief without ever considering the
claim independently? The sequence should not affect whether a particular
habeas petitioner ultimately receives relief (if § 2254(d)(1) bars relief, then
it will bar relief regardless of whether the court addresses it first or
second). The sequence may, however, affect the extent to which lower
federal courts are able to develop federal law related to state criminal
justice systems. "' If federal habeas courts routinely uphold state court

convictions because they are supported by reasonable state court opinions,
without ever addressing the legal issues independently, then federal habeas
courts will have no part in the "dialogue" over federal rights.'71

A similar issue has arisen in other contexts. The doctrine of qualified
immunity, for example, immunizes state officials from monetary liability
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' 72
169. Yackle argues that the federal habeas court should first decide the issue
independently and then ask whether the state court's decision passes muster under
§ 2254(d)(1). See Yackle, supra note 73, at 1754.
170. This very question was the subject of a recent case before the en banc Fourth
Circuit. See Bell, 236 F.3d 149. Compare id. at 162 n. 10:
Today, we hold that a federal court conclusion that a state court has "erred" in
its opinion on a "close" case is not required. A federal habeas court may
determine that the issue is "close," and therefore not unreasonable, without
rendering an opinion as to whether it would reach the same conclusion if
presented with the identical issue on direct appeal or by way of a § 2255
application.
with id. at 177 (Motz, J., dissenting):
[W]e must (1) ascertain what law the Supreme Court has established as to the
constitutional right to a public trial and effective assistance of counsel, (2)
"independently ascertain whether the record reveals a violation" of these
constitutional rights-i.e., whether the state court erred in denying the writ, and
finally (3) determine if the state court decision-if erroneous-is also contrary
to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established law as
determined by the Supreme Court. The majority omits completely the second
part of this analysis.
171. Admittedly, the federal habeas court's review of the issues would not bind
subsequent state courts, because § 2254(d)(1) examines only whether the state court's
decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
172. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quotation marks and citation
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In this area, the Supreme Court has urged that federal courts first address
the constitutional issue independently, and second, decide whether the law
was clearly established, for purposes of qualified immunity.'7 3 This

approach allows federal courts to continue to develop federal law, even
though qualified immunity might ultimately bar relief. 74
' In the context of
Teague, however, a federal habeas court must first address whether Teague
bars relief and only then address the merits of the petitioner's claim.' 75

Commentators have criticized this approach to Teague precisely because it
could stifle development of federal law relating to state criminal justice
systems.176
Another issue is this: assuming that § 2254(d)(1) is read to target the

state court's actual reasoning, it might not always be clear where to look
for that reasoning. Suppose, for example, that the state's highest court
summarily rejects a defendant's claim, but a lower state court has written
an opinion on it. This scenario is similar to that faced by the Supreme
Court when it must determine whether a state court judgment rested on a
state law "procedural bar" that would preclude considering the merits on
federal habeas. 77
' In that context, where the state's highest court does not
indicate whether its decision was based on a state law bar, the Supreme
Court may "look through" to a lower state court that does provide
reasoning. ' Likewise, a federal habeas court applying § 2254(d)(1) might
be able to look through to a lower state court opinion that articulates how it
applied federal law.

omitted).
173. Id. ("A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if
so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) ("[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which
the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.").
174. Cf. John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary"
ConstitutionalRulings in Civil Rights DamagesActions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 410
(1999) (noting that allowing courts to bypass the merits would tend "if not to 'freeze'
constitutional law, then at least to retard its growth through civil rights damages actions").
175. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
176. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 800-01. But see Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2433, 2450-51 (1993).
177. "When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a
federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court." Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492
(1986); Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87-88).
178. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803 (creating a "presumption" that "[w]here there has
been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders
upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground").
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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Arguably the most critical issue that will face the federal courts in
applying § 2254(d)(1) is how that provision interacts with, displaces, or
incorporates certain aspects of the Teague anti-retroactivity doctrine. As
explained above, §2254(d)(1) is broader than Teague in some respects, but
it is narrower than Teague in others. It is broader than Teague, because
(1) it requires deference to a state court's reasonable, but incorrect,
application of established federal law, and (2) only Supreme Court law (not

circuit law) is relevant to whether the state court's ruling passes muster.
Section 2254(d)(1) is narrower than Teague, however, because it affects
habeas review only where the state court has adjudicated the claim on the
merits, whereas Teague applied regardless.
Nonetheless, § 2254(d)(1) and Teague are closely related. As Justice
Stevens recognized, "[t]he antiretroactivity rule recognized in Teague,

which prohibits reliance on 'new rules,' is the functional equivalent of a
statutory provision commanding exclusive reliance on 'clearly established

law.'"' 79 This overlap potentially implicates several issues. One issue is

whether § 2254(d)(1) should be read to abrogate Teague altogether because
it covers much of the same territory that Teague did. 0 Another issue is
whether § 2254(d)(1) should be read to incorporate the court-made
exceptions to Teague's retroactivity bar. 1 ' For example, Teague applied
only to new rules of criminal procedure; therefore, it did not bar
retroactive application of new substantive rules.' 2 Teague also contained
179. Williams, 529 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J.).
With one caveat, whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague
jurisprudence will constitute "clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States" under § 2254(d)(1). The one caveat,
as the statutory language makes clear, is that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of
clearly established law to this Court's jurisprudence.
Id. at 412 (O'Connor, J.) (citations omitted).
180. Chen, supra note 1, at 589-90 ("Teague cannot possibly operate side by side
with [§ 2254(d)(1)]."); Yackle, supra note 12, at 415-16 ("The ostensible similarities
between Teague and § 2254(d) being conceded, however, the only thing that follows for
sure is that the two cannot function in tandem . . . .The questions that Teague and the
statute contemplate overlap too much to make any such seriatim analysis a sensible
exercise."); Yackle, supra note 73, at 1755 ("There is an argument, then, that section
2254(d)(1) occupies the field in which Teague has operated, borrowing from Teague only
'slight[ly]' and displacing that doctrine in all other respects. I don't read Terry Williams to
foreclose that result."). Because Teague's retroactivity bar was never constitutionally
required, see Higginbotham, supranote 176, at 2441 (citing James S. Liebman, More Than
"Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court'sRout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionin Teague v.
Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV.L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 558 n. 110, 628 & n.480 (1991)), this view
is a plausible one.
181. Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standardsof Review for Habeas Corpus Under
the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1884-85 (1997) (considering whether
§ 2254(d)(1) incorporates the Teague exceptions).
182. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) ("Teague by its terms
applies only to procedural rules."); Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 905 (6th Cir.
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an exception for "watershed" procedural rules that "implicat[e] the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." 18 3 If
§ 2254(d)(1) is read to incorporate these exceptions, then a petitioner may
be able to invoke certain new rules even if the state court's decision was
consistent with the law that was "established" at the time of conviction.
VII. CONCLUSION
I argue that § 2254(d)(1) bars federal habeas relief only where the
state court articulates its legal analysis and that analysis reasonably applies
the established rule of constitutional law. If the state court fails to do so,
then the federal court may proceed to decide issues of federal constitutional
law independently. Accordingly, the federal habeas court's inquiry under
§ 2254(d)(1) must focus on the state court's actual opinion. Where the
state court issues an opinion, the habeas court must apply the two-pronged
analysis set forth in Williams: 1) did the state court apply the correct rule
of law, and 2) was that application reasonable? Where that reasoning fails
Williams's two-pronged test, or where the state court fails to explain its
reasoning, the federal habeas court must decide the legal issues
independently, as was the case prior to AEDPA under Brown v. Allen.
There is no question that the Supreme Court's construction of
§ 2254(d)(1) in Williams entails some deference to state courts, even on
pure issues of federal law and its application. But Williams is just the
beginning of the debate over how federal courts should apply § 2254(d)(1)
in reviewing state court rulings. Although it is a significant change from
the prior regime of de novo review, § 2254(d)(1) does not require federal
habeas courts to completely abdicate their responsibility to interpret and
apply federal law. Where the state court fails to reasonably apply clearly
established federal law, or provides no legal basis whatsoever for denying
relief, the federal court's obligation to interpret and apply federal law must
come to the fore.

2000) ("[I]f the new case announces a substantive rule, Teague does not apply.") (citing
Bousley).
183. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 157 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Teague also
created an exception for new rules "prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class
of defendants because of their status or offense." Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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